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CAN MYSPACE TURN INTO MY LAWSUIT?: THE
APPLICATION OF DEFAMATION LAW TO
ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the online world of social networking sites, MySpace has emerged
as the dominant website on the Internet 1 to "share photos, journals and
interests with your growing network of mutual friends."2 As of July 2006,
MySpace accounted for eighty percent of visits to online social networking
sites-its closest competition being FaceBook, at 7.6%. In August of
2006, MySpace enrolled its one hundred millionth user,4 and reportedly
registers 230,000 new users on a typical day. 5 To put these numbers in
perspective, if MySpace were a country and each user were a citizen, it
would rank as the twelfth most populous country in the world, trailing
narrowly behind Mexico and beating the next closest, the Philippines, by
over ten million people.6
MySpace is a social networking website that allows users to create
profile pages in which they can include personal information such as age,
gender, sexual orientation, relationship status, photographs, and even
online journals-commonly known as "blogs. ' 7 Once users create their
profiles, they can invite other friends to join their personal networks, 8
1. USATODAY.com, MySpace Gains Top Ranking of U.S. Websites (July 11, 2006),
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-07-1 1-myspace-tops.x.htm.
2. MySpace.com, About Us,
http://www.myspace.com/modules/common/pages/aboutus.aspx (last visited Oct. 18, 2007).
3. USATODAY.com, supra note 1.
4. Rupert Murdoch, Rupert Murdoch Comments on Fox Interactive's Growth (Aug. 9,
2006),
http://seekingalpha.com/article/1 5237-rupert-murdoch-comments-on-fox-interactive-sgrowth.
5. Patricia Sellers, MySpace Cowboys (Aug. 29, 2006),
http://money.cnn.commagazines/fortune/fortune-archive/2006/09/04/8384727/index.htm?postve

rsion=2006082909.
6. See Matt Rosenberg, About.com, Most Populous Countries, Nov. 10, 2006,
http://geography.about.com/cs/worldpopulation/a/ mostpopulous.htm.
7. Amanda Gefter, This Is Your Space, NEW SCIENTIST, Sept. 16, 2006, at 46.
8. MySpace.com, Take the MySpace Tour!, http://collect.myspace.com/misc/tour_2.html
(last visited Oct. 13, 2007).
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browse for new "friends" on MySpace, 9 or browse other users' "Friends
List[s]" as well.10 In addition to the inclusion of a blog for every user, each
user page also contains a "Comments" section where the user's friends can
leave comments which are displayed for everyone to see. 1" There is also a
bulletin feature that allows users to send messages to everyone on their
MySpace user's friends list simultaneously. 2 What results is an extended
multi-party blog, where users can easily find old friends and make new
ones, and even become friends with their friends' friends and so on.
Anytime so many people gather in a single place, even in a virtual
setting, problems arise in getting everyone to behave well together. As in
the real world, people socializing in the virtual world will inevitably have
personality conflicts, misunderstandings, and occasional bouts of
misbehavior. Unlike the real world, the virtual world of MySpace is
primarily governed by the Terms of Use Agreement ("TUA") which acts as
a legally binding contract for its users.' 3 MySpace could regulate the
majority of its users' unruly behavior by enforcing the TUA, which
contains a number of provisions for unacceptable behavior and reserves the
absolute right to banish users from its realm.' 4 The TUA specifies that
"MySpace.com reserves the right to investigate and take appropriate legal
action against anyone who, in MySpace.com's sole discretion, violates this
provision, including without limitation, removing the offending
communication from the MySpace Services and terminating the
Membership of such violators."' 15 However, due to the novelty, size, and
ready accessibility of user profiles, the remedies offered under the TUA
may not be adequate to address all conduct.
For example, a university professor in Richmond, Virginia, recently
gave his advertising class an assignment to make Oscar, his six-year-old
pug, famous. 16 While most of the students approached this assignment by
posting fliers around campus with the dog's picture on them, one student
7
made a posting on MySpace under a false name, threatening to kill Oscar.'
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Gefter, supra note 7, at 47.
12. Id. at 46.
13. MySpace.com, Terms of Use Agreement,
http://www.myspace.commodules/common/pages/termsconditions.aspx

(last modified Apr. 11,

2007).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. USATODAY.com, Ad Assignment Goes Awry on MySpace (Sept.
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-09-22-myspace-pug-prankx.htm.
17. Id.

22, 2006),
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After animal activists around the world contacted authorities to report the
threat, the Richmond police stated, "[T]his threat is the result of a VCU
student's assignment that
went awry. We want to stress that at no time was
8
any animal in danger."'
Although the university declined to file charges against the student,1 9
the fake page about Oscar is a good example of how the simple act of
creating an online profile can have amplified consequences on a network as
large as MySpace. This story is also an indication that actions in the virtual
world can easily have real world consequences. As of this writing,
MySpace-related cases have not yet flooded the courts, but the trickle has
begun.
In May 2006, Georgia high school teacher Robert Muzillo pressed
criminal charges against one of his students after the student posted a fake
profile under Muzillo's name on MySpace. 20 The fake profile falsely
claimed, among other things, that Muzillo had "lost an eye wrestling with
alligators and midgets.",21 The charges were later dropped because they
relied on a statute that the Georgia Supreme Court had ruled
unconstitutional in 1982,22 and the student only served a three day
suspension from the school.23
More recently, San Antonio high school assistant principal Anna
Draker filed a civil suit against two students and their parents after the
students allegedly posted a lewd MySpace profile under Draker's name
because it falsely identified her as a lesbian.24 In the suit, Draker made
claims of "defamation, libel, negligence and negligent supervision over the
[MySpace] page. 2 5 It remains to be seen how the Texas courts will handle
these allegations.
The question courts will need to address is whether thc law of
defamation will apply in the context of a MySpace prank. There is an
additional consideration the courts will need to address-namely, how the
"virtual law" created by MySpace's TUA will harmonize with "real world
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. WSBTV.com, Student Faces Criminal Charges for Teacher Jokes (May 16, 2006),
http://www.wsbtv.com/education/ 9223824/detail.html.
21. Id.
22. Johnny Jackson, MySpace Case: Charge Against ELHS Freshman Dismissed, HENRY
DAILY HERALD-ONLINE, May 24,2006,
http://www.henryherald.com/homepage/local-story- 144000539.html?keyword=leadpicturestory.
23. WSBTV.com, supra note 20.
24. USATODAY.com, Official Sues Students over MySpace Page (Sept. 22, 2006),
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2006-09-22-myspace-suit-x.htm.
25. Id.
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law" in its application to MySpace users.
Section II will provide a background on defamation law and how it
has fared on the Internet. Section III will take these findings and apply
them to the context of MySpace users. Section IV will conclude that users
should be subject to defamation law for the statements or content they
create on their personal pages, but not necessarily for statements posted by
other users. The casual and social atmosphere of MySpace may make it
more difficult for user conduct to rise to the level of tortious defamation
under the standard common law elements, but any communication by users
that meets those elements will face legal liability. This final section will
also make brief recommendations on how defamation law on the Internet
could be improved.
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

The Basics of Defamation Law

The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that
"Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech or of the
press. 26 For the first time, in 1964, the United States Supreme Court made
it clear that the constitutional protection of free speech applies to
defamation law, and that states must remain within constitutional
limitations when approaching defamation.2 7 Thus, finding liability for
defamation not only involves recognizing when there is defamatory
communication, but also assuring that liability only attaches when the
constitutional protection is abused.2 8
The Second Restatement of Torts provides a general set of elements
that would result in liability:
To create liability for defamation there must be:
(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another;
(b) an unprivileged publication to a third party;
(c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the
publisher; and

26. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
27. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) ("Like insurrection,
contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal
business, and the various other formulae for the repression of expression that have been
challenged in this Court, libel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations.
It must be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment.").
28. See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).

20071

CAN MYSPA CE TURN INTO MY LAWSUIT?

(d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special
harm or the existence of special harm caused by the
publication.29
1. The First Element: A False and Defamatory Statement Concerning
Another
In general, a defamatory statement is one that "harm[s] the reputation
of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter
third persons from associating or dealing with him.",30 An example of the
kind of harm to reputation fitting the mold of defamation is a
communication that would adversely affect the perception of a person's
morality or financial standing, 3 ' or that would indicate some kind of mental
or physical infirmity, such as venereal disease or insanity.32
In addition to harm to reputation, the first element of liability for
defamation requires that a statement be false. 33 The statement may purport
to be factual,34 or if stated as an opinion, must imply "the allegation of
undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion., 35 For example,
if a person states, "My neighbor Bob is a drug addict," this qualifies as a
statement of fact, and is defamatory if false. If the person says, "I think my
neighbor Bob is a drug addict," this implies an assumption of facts pointing
to Bob being a drug addict, and also qualifies as a defamatory statement.
However, if the statement were, "I think Bob is a real jerk," this is a matter
of pure opinion, and is not considered defamatory.
Finally, to qualify as a defamatory statement, the communication does
not have to damage a person's reputation in the eyes of society as a whole,
but can be limited to damaging one's reputation within a "substantial and
respectable" minority group. 36 For example, the use of anti-depressants
may be generally accepted, but if there is a segment of society that views
such use as a sign of weakness, making false statements about the use of
anti-depressants may qualify as defamation.

29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).

30. Id. § 559.
31. See id. § 559 cmt. b.
32. Id. § 559 cmt. c.

33. Id. § 558(a).
34. Id. § 565.
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977).

36. Id. § 559 cmt. e.
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2. The Second Element: Unprivileged Publication to a Third Party
The publication element requires communication "to some one other
than the person being defamed. 3 7 A "publication" is a defamatory
statement communicated "intentionally or by a negligent act to one other
than the person defamed., 38 Under general tort law, an action is
"privileged" if made with the consent of the affected party,3 9 if justified by
necessity, 4 ° or if "the actor is performing a function for the proper
performance of which freedom of action is essential. '41 Unless there is
consent or other valid justification, defamatory publication is unprivileged.
3. The Third and Fourth Elements: The Level of Fault Versus the
Requirement for Special Harm Caused by the Publication
The third and fourth elements of defamation are interdependent in that
the necessity to show special harm depends on the level of the actor's42
knowledge or "reckless disregard as to the falsity of the communication.,
The classification of a statement as defamatory is not dependent upon
whether a person's reputation is actually damaged.43 Rather, the question44
is whether the statement has a "general tendency to have such an effect.",
However, the Constitution requires a showing of actual damage to
reputation if the actor is subjectively unaware of the statement's
falsehood.4 5
4. Slander Versus Libel
Defamation law distinguishes between two types of publication:
libel, which is communication through written or printed words, and
slander, which is communication through speaking.46 The primary legal
distinction is that there are more restrictions regarding when a slanderous
publication can result in liability without showing that it caused special
harm.4 7 This Article assumes that most materials posted to a fixed online
37. Id. § 577 cmt. b.
38. Id. § 577(l).
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. § 10(2)(a).
Id. § 10(2)(b).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 10(2)(c) (1977).
Id. § 559 cmt. d.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 568.
Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 569 (1977) ("One who falsely publishes
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location, such as MySpace, fall under the category of libel, because this is
how the courts have generally treated online defamation.4 8 Accordingly,
references to defamatory material on MySpace in this Article will be
analyzed as libel rather than slander.
5. Liability of Republishers
Every time a defamatory statement is repeated by a new party, it is
considered a new publication and is actionable as a separate tort. 49 The
Restatement states that, "[e]xcept as to those who only deliver or transmit
defamation published by a third person, one who repeats or otherwise
republishes defamatory matter is subject to liability as if he had originally
published it.', 50 A major effect of this provision is to hold larger media
entities, such as newspapers, liable for publishing defamatory stories even
if they make it clear that they are not the original source of the statement.5 1
Liability under this principle can also extend to vendors and
distributors, such as bookstores and libraries, unless "they neither know nor
have reason to know of the defamation. ''52 This exception to liability
demonstrates how the First Amendment protection in the Constitution 53 can
work to place limitations on recovery in defamation law. For example, the
United States Supreme Court struck down a New York law that would hold
bookstore owners liable for possession of obscene books, whether or not
they were aware of the books' contents 4

matter defamatory of another in such a manner as to make the publication a libel is subject to
liability to the other although no special harm results from the publication."), with RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 570 (1977) ("One who publishes matter defamatory to another in such a
manner as to make the publication a slander is subject to liability to the other although no special
harm results if the publication imputes to the other (a) a criminal offense, as stated in § 571, or (b)
a loathsome disease, as stated in § 572, or (c) matter incompatible with his business, trade,
profession, or office, as stated in § 573, or (d) serious sexual misconduct, as stated in §574.").
48. See generally Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc.,
129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998); Cubby, Inc.
v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 cmt. b (1977).
50. Id. § 578.
51. Id. § 578 cmt. b.
52. Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 228, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); accord
Macaluso v. Mondadori Publ'g Co., 527 F. Supp. 1017, 1019 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
53. U.S. CONST. amend. I.

54. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153 (1959) ('Every bookseller would be placed
under an obligation to make himself aware of the contents of every book in his shop. It would be
altogether unreasonable to demand so near an approach to omniscience.' And the bookseller's
burden would become the public's burden, for by restricting him the public's access to reading
matter would be restricted." (citation omitted)).
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B. The Evolution of Defamation Law on the Internet
55

1. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe

Originally, courts attempted to apply the standard rules of defamation
For instance, in Cubby, Inc. v.
to publications on the Internet.
CompuServe, the court found defendant CompuServe free of liability
because it did not monitor or edit any of the information posted by its
customers. 56 CompuServe provided an online "electronic library" which
contained more than 150 special interest forums,5 7 one of which was a
CompuServe contracted another company,
"Journalism Forum." 58
Cameron Communications Inc. ("CCI"), to "'manage, review, create,
delete, edit and otherwise control the contents' of the Journalism Forum 'in
accordance with editorial and technical standards and conventions of style
as established by CompuServe.' '' 59 CCI then contracted with other
businesses to provide content, one of which was Don Fitzpatrick Associates
of San Francisco ("DFA"), the publisher of a daily newsletter called
Rumorville.6 °
In 1990, the plaintiffs developed Skuttlebutt, a database intended to
compete with Rumorville. 61 Rumorville responded by posting false and
defamatory statements alleging that Skuttlebutt was a "new start-up scam"
that stole information from Rumorville.6 2 The plaintiffs then asserted
claims against CompuServe and DFA, including libel.63
The court approached the libel claim against CompuServe by first
concluding that "[a] computerized database is the functional equivalent of a
more traditional news vendor." 64 The appropriate standard of liability for
CompuServe, as a news distributor, would be "whether it knew or had
reason to know of the allegedly defamatory Rumorville statements. 6 5
Taking into consideration that CompuServe's product carried "a vast

55. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
56. See id. at 141.
57. Id. at 137 ("Forums" here are described as a collection of "electronic bulletin boards,
interactive online conferences, and topical databases.").

58. Id.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id.
Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 138.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 140-41.
Id.
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number of publications," the court concluded that CompuServe would have
"little or no editorial control over [Rumorville]'s contents," especially
66
when an unrelated company managed editorial control over the forum.
Accordingly, the court held that CompuServe was not liable for
defamation.6 7
2.

The Birth of the "Good Samaritan" Provision

In response to concerns that Internet service providers could face
liability if they actually did attempt to monitor or remove content, Congress
passed § 230(c), also called the "Good Samaritan" provision, of the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 ("CDA").68 The "Good Samaritan"
provision states that "[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider., 69 Congress enacted
this provision in the wake of a New York Supreme Court decision that
found defendant Prodigy Services Company liable for defamation because
it sought to exert editorial control.7 °
In that case, an anonymous poster made defamatory statements about
the plaintiffs on Prodigy's "Money Talk" bulletin board, contending that
the plaintiffs had committed criminal and fraudulent acts. 71 Based on the
court's decision in Cubby, the court agreed that "[c]omputer bulletin boards
should generally be regarded in the same context as bookstores, libraries
and network affiliates. 7 2 However, the court held that Prodigy had

66. See id. at 140-43 ("CompuServe has no more editorial control over such a publication
than does a public library, book store, or newsstand, and it would be no more feasible for
CompuServe to examine every publication it carries for potentially defamatory statements than it
would be for any other distributor to do so." The court went on to state "Based on the undisputed
facts, the Court concludes that neither CCI nor DFA should be considered an agent of
CompuServe. CompuServe, CCI, and DFA are independent of one another.").
67. Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 141.
68. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4) (2000) (stating that it is the policy of the United States "to
remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies
that empower parents to restrict their children's access to objectionable or inappropriate online
material"); see also Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 ("Faced with potential liability for each message
republished by their services, interactive computer service providers might choose to severely
restrict the number and type of messages posted. Congress considered the weight of the speech
interests implicated and chose to immunize service providers to avoid any such restrictive
effect.").
69. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2000).
70. Stratton Oakmont Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1794, 1798 (N.Y.
1995), superseded by statute, Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000).
71. Id. at 1795.
72. Id. at 1798.
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distinguished itself from those distribution services, and achieved the status
of "publisher," by "actively utilizing technology and manpower to delete
notes from its computer bulletin boards on the basis of offensiveness and
'bad taste.' 73 The court concluded, "Prodigy's conscious choice, to gain
the benefits of editorial control, has opened it up to a greater liability74than
CompuServe and other computer networks that make no such choice.",
3. The Congressional Purpose of 47 U.S.C. § 230
Congress enacted the "Good Samaritan" provision, in part, as a
response to the decision in Stratton Oakmont.75 Where Stratton Oakmont
held that an interactive computer service provider may be treated as a
publisher for editing third party postings, 76 Congress specifically ordered
"[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider. 7 7 Where Stratton Oakmont found that
Prodigy's decision to exercise editorial control over postings opened it to
greater liability, 78 the "Good Samaritan" clause states that service providers
face no liability for "any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict
access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or
whether or not such material is constitutionally
otherwise objectionable,
79
protected.,
In establishing § 230 of the CDA, Congress found that the "Internet
and other interactive computer services available to individual Americans
represent an extraordinary advance in the availability of educational and
informational resources to our citizens .... [offering] a forum for a true
diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural
development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.' 80 Congress
also noted that Americans are becoming increasingly reliant "on interactive
media for a variety of political, educational, cultural, and entertainment
services," with the Internet and other interactive computer services
flourishing, "to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of
73. Id. at 1797.
74. Id. at 1798.
75. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) ("Congress enacted
§ 230 to remove the disincentives to self-regulation created by the Stratton Oakmont decision.").
76. See Stratton Oakmont, 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1798.
77. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2000).
78. See Stratton Oakmont, 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1798.
79. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (2000).
80. Id. § 230(a)(3).
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government regulation.,
Accordingly, Congress stated that the policy reasons of the Act were
"to promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive
computer services and other interactive media ' 82 and "to preserve the
vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet
and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State
regulation. 83 In addition, Congress aimed "to remove disincentives for the
development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that
empower parents to restrict their
children's access to objectionable or
84
inappropriate online material.,
The purpose of encouraging regulation of objectionable materials
appears related to the establishment of a "Good Samaritan" clause.
However, in light of the other purposes detailed above, Congress also
seemed to believe that freeing service providers from such liability would
protect the development of the Internet as a whole.8 5
The question that remains, and one that courts have continued to deal
with since the establishment of the CDA, is who qualifies for immunity
under the "Good Samaritan" provision.8 6 Section 230(c) repeatedly
identifies the protected entities as "providers" or "users" of "an interactive
computer service. '' 87 Section 230(f) defines "interactive computer service"
as "any information service, system, or access software provider that
provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer
server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the
Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or
educational institutions., 88 On its face, it appears that Congress intended
"Good Samaritan" immunity to apply, not only to every service provider on
the Internet, but to every person who accesses the Internet as well.

81. Id. § 230(a)(4)-(5).
82. Id. § 230(b)(1).
83. Id. § 230(b)(2).
84. Id.§ 230(b)(4).

85. See generally47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000).
86. See generally Zeran, 129 F.3d 327; Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. 44; Batzel, 333 F.3d 1018;
Barrett v. Rosenthal, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), rev'd, 40 Cal. 4th 33 (2006); Doe
v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005).
87. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2000).
88. Id. § 230(0(2).
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C. Court Cases After the "Good Samaritan" Provision
1. Zeran v. America Online, Inc.
The first major case after Congress passed § 230 was Zeran v.
America Online ("AOL") in 1997.89 In Zeran, an anonymous poster
advertised "Naughty Oklahoma T-Shirts" on an AOL bulletin board. 90
These shirts contained "offensive and tasteless" slogans regarding the 1995
bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal Building and instructed any
interested buyers to contact "Ken at Zeran's home phone number." 91 As a
result, Zeran received a large number of angry and derogatory phone calls,
including death threats. 92 Zeran called AOL repeatedly to report the
problem, and AOL representatives assured him that they would close the
message poster's account.93 Over the next four days, more and more
offensive advertisements appeared on the forums, now touting "bumper
stickers and key chains with still more offensive slogans. 94 By the fifth
day, "Zeran was receiving an abusive phone call approximately every two
minutes. 95
Zeran argued that, after he notified AOL of the hoax, "AOL had a
duty to remove the defamatory posting promptly, to notify its subscribers
of the message's false nature, and to effectively screen future defamatory
material. 96 The court, interpreting § 230, responded that "lawsuits seeking
to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher's traditional
editorial functions-such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw,
postpone or alter content-are barred., 97 The court reasoned that
"[b]ecause the probable effects of distributor liability on the vigor of
Internet speech and on service provider self-regulation are directly contrary
to § 230's statutory purposes, we will
not assume that Congress intended to
98
leave liability upon notice intact."

89. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
90. Id. at 329.

91. Id.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329.
Id. at 330.
Id.
Id. at 333.
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2.

The Reluctant Court in Blumenthal v. Drudge

The courts, however, have not always approved of the blanket
immunity that Congress created in the "Good Samaritan" provision. 99 In
Blumenthal v. Drudge, decided the year after Zeran, another consumer sued
AOL.1 °° The court opined:
[if] it were writing on a clean slate, this Court would agree with
plaintiff... [b]ecause it has the [r]ight to exercise editorial
control over those with whom it contracts and whose words it
disseminates, it would seem only fair to hold AOL to the
liability standards applied to a publisher or, at least, like a book
store owner0 or library, to the liability standards applied to a
distributor.' 0
However, the court recognized that "Congress has made a different
policy choice by providing immunity even where the interactive service
provider has an active, even aggressive role in making available content
prepared by others."' 2 Hence, even in a case where the court disagreed
with the outcome, it still kept its decision in compliance with the
Congressional intent of § 230.
3. Batzel v. Smith
At the same time, some courts have recognized exceptions to blanket
immunity. 103 In Batzel v. Smith, defendant Robert Smith worked for the
plaintiff as a repairman at her home. 0 4 According to Smith, while he was
working, Batzel told him that she was "the granddaughter of one of Adolf
Hitler's right-hand men."'' 0 5 Smith also claimed to have "overheard Batzel
tell[ing] her roommate that she was related to Nazi politician Heinrich
Himmler."'' 0 6 In addition, Smith alleged that Batzel told him that "some of
the paintings hanging in her house were inherited"
and Smith believed
07
European."'
and
old
looked
paintings...
"these
99. See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 51-52 (D.D.C. 1998); see also Gucci Am.,
Inc. v. Hall & Assocs., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
100. Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. 44.
101. Id. at 51-52.
102. Id. at 52.
103. See, e.g., Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1034 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Fair Hous.
Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, L.L.C., 489 F.3d 921, 925 (9th Cir. 2007).
104. Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1020.
105. Id. at 1020-21.
106. Id. at 1021.

107. Id.
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Suspicious that the paintings were the product of Nazi looting during
World War II, Smith conducted an online search for websites about stolen
art work and wrote an email expressing his concerns to the Museum
Security Network website.'0 8 Smith closed the email by stating, "Please
contact me via email ... if you would like to discuss this matter." 10 9
Instead of responding to Smith, defendant Ton Cremers, the sole
operator of the Museum Security Network ("Network"),1 1 0 posted the email
on the website and to the listserv" l for subscribers to his site. 1 2 Cremers
also posted a "moderator's message" that stated that "the FBI has been
informed of the contents of [Smith's] original message."' 1 3 The website
and listserv mailings exposed Smith's email to "hundreds of museum
security officials, insurance investigators, and law enforcement personnel
around the world,' 1who
use the information in the Network posting to track
4
down stolen art."'
Smith was surprised to learn that Cremers posted his message,' 15 and
told Cremers that if he had known, he would never have sent it. 1 16 The
court found that neither Cremers' "minor alterations of Smith's email"
prior to posting it, nor his decision to publish the email, rose to the level of
"development," and therefore, "Cremers cannot be considered the content
provider of Smith's e-mail for purposes of § 230."' The court stated that
ordinarily the conclusion that Cremers was not a content provider would
end the investigation into his liability. 18
However, the court's
interpretation of the "Good Samaritan" provision was that it would not
extend immunity to Cremers if the defamatory information was not
"providedby another information content provider."'" 19
In this case, the court reasoned that it was not clear whether Smith
108. See id.
109. Id.
110. See Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1021.
111. Id. at 1021 n.2 ("A listserv is an automatic mailing list service that amounts to an email discussion group... Subscribers receive and send messages that are distributed to all others

on the listserv.").
112. Id. at 1022.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See id. ("'I [was] trying to figure out how in blazes I could have posted me [sic] email
to [the Network] bulletin board ....Every message board to which I have ever subscribed
required application, a password, and/or registration, and the instructions explained this is
necessary to keep out the advertisers, cranks, and bumbling idiots like me."').
116. See Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1022.
117. Id. at 1031.
118. See id.at 1032.
119. Id.at 1032 (quoting 47 U.S.C. §230(c) (2000)) (emphasis in original).
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"provided" the email for publication on the Internet, because Smith said he
20
would never have sent the email if he had known it would be posted.
The court concluded that "[t]he congressional objectives in passing § 230
therefore are not furthered by providing immunity in instances where
posted material was clearly not meant for publication., 121 Accordingly, the
court framed a new rule to attach to § 230(c)(1), stating that a provider or
user would enjoy immunity only if the defamatory information was
provided "under circumstances in which a reasonable person in the position
of the service provider or user would conclude that the information was
provided for publication on the Internet or other 'interactive computer
service.'122
4. Barrett v. Rosenthal
Not all courts have agreed about the scope of immunity offered by the
"Good Samaritan" provision. In Barrett v. Rosenthal, the California Court
of Appeal examined the CDA language that guarantees that "[n]o provider
or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher
or speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider."1 23 The court noted a common law notion that "those who
publicize another's libel may be treated in one of three ways: as primary
publishers (such as book or newspaper publishers); as conduits (such as a
telephone company); or as distributors (such as a book store, library, or
news dealer). ' 24 The court then acknowledged that, although § 230(c) bars
liability against interactive computer services as primary publishers of third
25
party information, it would not bar their liability as distributors.
Consequently, the court found that the CDA "cannot be deemed to abrogate
the common law principle that one who republishes defamatory matter
originated by a third person is subject to liability
ifhe or she knows or has
126
reason to know of its defamatory character."'
In November 2006, the California Supreme Court reversed the lower
court's decision, stating that, while "[t]he prospect of blanket immunity for
those who intentionally redistribute defamatory statements on the Internet
has disturbing implications. . . by its terms section 230 exempts Internet
120.
121.
122.
123.
33 (2006)
124.
125.
126.

See id. at 1034.
Id.
Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1034.
Barrett v. Rosenthal, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142, 155 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), rev'd 40 Cal. 4th
(quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2000)).
Id. at 150 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2000)).
Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2001)).
Id. at 152 (emphasis in original).
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intermediaries from defamation liability for republication." ' 12 7 Although
this decision reinstated blanket immunity as the rule, the history of this case
demonstrates how courts are both reluctant and conflicted about this
interpretation.
5.

Doe v. Cahill

In addition to the immunities provided by the CDA, individual users
might avoid defamation liability, even if they are the primary publishers,
depending on where their statements are published. In Doe v. Cahill, the
anonymous defendant, "Doe," posted statements on the "Smyma/Clayton
Issues Blog," a website that referred to itself as "your hometown forum for
opinions about public issues." 128 In his postings, Doe stated that Smyrna
City Councilman Patrick Cahill had "character flaws," suffered "obvious
mental deterioration," and was "as paranoid as everyone in the town thinks
he is.",129 The Delaware Supreme Court concluded that, because anyone
with access to the Internet could post on the board and anonymous postings
were the norm, a "reasonable reader would not view the blanket,
unexplained statements at issue as 'facts,"",130 and therefore, such
statements could only be interpreted as "'subjective speculation' or 'merely
rhetorical hyperbole.' ' 131 Although careful to explain that it was not
holding, as a matter of law, that blog or chat room statements could never
be defamatory, the court maintained that a plaintiff suing for statements
a statement is factually based and
made in such forums "must prove that132
thus capable of a defamatory meaning."
III. ANALYSIS
A.

"Good Samaritan" Protection Will Apply to MySpace Users

The rise of social networking sites such as MySpace presents users
with an environment that contains both novel and familiar elements from
As the discussion above
the established world of the Internet.
demonstrates, most of the online defamation issues that have made it to the
courts have originated with statements posted on forums and bulletin
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Barrett v. Rosenthal, 40 Cal. 4th 33, 62 (2006).
Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 454 (Del. 2005).
Id.
Id. at 466.
Id.
Id. at 467-68 n.78.
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boards, which are static locations on the Internet that can often be viewed
by anyone. 133 Potentially defamatory statements may also be posted to a
listserv, 34 which sends its postings to a list of subscribers. 135 Although the
terminology of MySpace features may vary from other networking sites,
the communication functions are substantially similar. The basic MySpace
profile is simply a location to post information about the user. 136 In
addition, the journal or blog functions exist to allow each user to post
statements, comments, or observations that can be viewed by anyone with
an Internet connection.137 On MySpace, the "Bulletin Board" function is
similar to a listserv in that posted messages are automatically sent to
everyone on the user's friend network. 138 Finally, the "Comments" section
on each user page gives other users the ability to post their own
comments, 139 making each user a potential provider of an interactive
service for others.
To determine if and when MySpace users would benefit from the
protection of the "Good Samaritan" provision, 4 it is necessary to examine
the various methods of communication available to the users in light of the
requirements for eligibility under the provision. Section 230(c) of the CDA
states, "No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider."' 4' The Batzel court broke down § 230(c)
into three elements that must be fulfilled in order to qualify for immunity:
(1) the defendant must be a provider or user of an "interactive
computer service;"
(2) the asserted claims must treat the defendant as a publisher or
speaker of information; and
(3) the challenged communication must be 1"information
42
provided by another information content provider.'
This three-part test provides a useful guide for determining when
133. See, e.g., Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 138 (S.D.N.Y. 1991);
Stratton Oakmont Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 23 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1794, 1127, (N.Y. 1995);
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 329 (4th Cir. 1997); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018,
1022 (9th Cir. 2003); Cahill, 884 A.2d at 454.
134. See Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1022.
135. Id. at 1021 n.2.
136. Gefter, supra note 7.
137. Id. at 46-47.
138. Id. at 46.
139. Id.
140. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2000).
141. Id. § 230(c)(1).
142. Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1037.
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CDA immunity applies. It may also provide a good starting point in
determining whether MySpace users will benefit from its protection.
1. MySpace Users as Providers or Users of an "Interactive Computer
Service"
According to the CDA, an "interactive computer service" is "any
information service, system, or access software provider that provides or
enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server." 143 The
CDA defines the Internet as an "international computer network,"' 144 which
leads to the logical conclusion that anyone who uses a service to access the
Internet would be a user of an interactive computer service. Under this
broad definition, all MySpace users fulfill the first element of this test by
accessing the Internet.
2.

The Asserted Claims Must Treat the MySpace User as a Publisher or
Speaker of Information

The second element of the test addresses the defamation rule which
states that, "[e]xcept as to those who only deliver or transmit defamation
published by a third person, one who repeats or otherwise republishes
defamatory matter is subject to liability as if he had originally published
it.' ' 145 This rule has enabled courts to hold entities such as newspapers
liable for publishing defamatory stories, even if they were not the original
46
source of the statements. 1
In the context of MySpace, there are a number of ways a user could
satisfy this element. If a user repeated statements from another source in a
blog, comment, or bulletin board post, that user would be treated as a
publisher under standard defamation law.
If someone else posted
comments on the user's page, the user could also be treated as a publisher
due to his or her almost exclusive editorial control over the content allowed
on the page. In addition, any time users post information on their own
MySpace page, on a bulletin board, or as a comment posted on someone
else's page, they would be the original publishers of that information and
would fulfill this element. However, the third element of the test renders
14
original posters ineligible for CDA immunity. 1

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (2000).
Id. § 230(f)(1).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977).
Id. § 578 cmt. b.
See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1037 (9th Cir. 2003).
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3. The Challenged Communication Must Be Information Provided by
Another Information Content Provider
The CDA defines an "information content provider" as "any person or
entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of information provided through the Internet or any other
interactive computer service." 148 A literal following of this definition could
yield interesting results. For example, if a MySpace user received an email
from a friend containing defamatory statements and posted that information
in a blog or comment, the user would be eligible for CDA immunity.
However, if the source were a traditional letter instead of an email,
immunity would not apply. This kind of inconsistency does not serve any
legitimate function. The acts of the MySpace user in this scenario would
be essentially identical in both cases, making it farcical to apply immunity
inone case and not the other.
Due to the legal issues surrounding the creation of the "Good
Samaritan" provision,149 it is likely that when Congress drafted § 230(c), it
intended to protect larger entities like AOL from being held responsible for
information that others posted using its service. Under such circumstances,
with potentially millions of users, an internet service provider would
generally be reposting information passively through the automated nature
of the service, despite policies that may attempt to filter or remove harmful
content. The inconsistency described above indicates that Congress may
not have focused much attention on the details of how such definitions
would affect smaller users, as opposed to large providers. This suggests
that Congress did not intend to protect a person in the position of a
MySpace user who actively republishes defamatory material.
However, the language of § 230(c)(1) identifies any "provider or user
of an interactive computer service" as the intended recipient of
immunity.' 50 This language is so broad that Congress likely intended to
protect practically everyone who uses the Internet. Inconsistencies like the
one posed in the hypothetical result from an inability to foresee every
possible circumstance that arises from constantly changing and evolving
technology. In accordance with this idea, the courts have progressively
applied immunity to smaller and smaller entities, such as the sole website
operator in Batzel v. Smith. 1 ' There, the operator would have qualified for
148. 47 U.S.C. § 230(0(3) (2000).
149. As previously indicated in Section II(B)(2), the CDA was created in the wake of
lawsuits against large corporate entities that provided Internet services.
150. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2000).
151. See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1021 (9th Cir. 2003).
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immunity if the original publisher had intended his statements to actually
be published in the manner that they were. 152 What this suggests, rather, is
that a MySpace user who reposts information received in either a letter or
an email will only enjoy CDA immunity if the original publisher intended
that the statements be posted on the Internet. The language of the "Good
Samaritan" provision and the rule framed by the Batzel court are consistent
with this idea. 153 This means that, despite the definition of "information
content provider" found in § 230(f)(3), immunity is not dependent upon
whether the defamatory information came from an Internet source or not,
but only if it was intended to end up published on the Internet. For
example, if a MySpace user received a letter from a friend with defamatory
statements and the instruction to, "Get this out on the bulletin boardeveryone's going to want to hear about this," then the statements have been
provided by a third party whose purpose was to publish on the Internet, and
the user would enjoy immunity.
Although this outcome may seem troubling, and likely not the result
Congress foresaw when it drafted the "Good Samaritan" provision, this has
been the way courts have applied the provision1 54 and seems to be
consistent with the language of § 23 0.155 Of course, the greater role that a
MySpace user plays in publishing the information, the more likely it is that
courts will view the user as an original publisher.1 56 Additionally, because
the user in this hypothetical would have to manually enter the contents of
the letter into an online posting, this may raise the user to the level of an
original publisher, rendering immunity inapplicable. Conversely, if the
original publisher sent the message via email and the MySpace user simply
pasted it into a bulletin board message, the facts of Batzel would be
analogous 157 and the user is more likely to enjoy immunity.
The most obvious scenario in which the MySpace user could enjoy
immunity would be if a third party posted defamatory statements in the
user's "Comments" section. In this case, the user would have republished
the statements in a completely passive manner, much like the way AOL
and CompuServe "republish" statements made on their forums.

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 1034.
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2000); Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1034.
Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1034.
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2000).
See Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1034.
Id. at 1021-22.
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B. A Possible Exception to CDA Immunity
The common law recognizes an exception to liability for those

republishers who "neither know nor have reason to know of the
defamation." 1 58 The court in Barrett v. Rosenthal wanted to preserve the
notion that republishers should be liable if they know or have reason to

know of a statement's defamatory character, even in light of the CDA
"Good Samaritan" provision.159 However, this is contrary to the general
holdings of other cases on the subject, which state that the exercise of
editorial functions like deciding whether to publish would still render the

republisher immune from liability under the CDA. 160 The whole purpose
of the "Good Samaritan" provision
is to bar liability on the Internet when
161
liability would otherwise apply.

Therefore, it seems likely that MySpace users who are simply found
to be republishers will enjoy CDA immunity regardless of whether they

knew or had reason to know of the statements' defamatory character.
While this may seem counterintuitive, the majority of courts exclude
knowledge as a 62
factor when republishers otherwise qualify for immunity
under the CDA

1

C. MySpace Users as OriginalPublishers
As the CDA "Good Samaritan" provision and the Batzel test indicate,
immunity does not apply to the original publishers of defamatory
information.1 63 In the pending court cases described in the Introduction,
1 64
MySpace users posted pages purporting to be created by the plaintiffs.
Therefore, the defendants in both of these cases will be subject to standard
158. Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 228, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); accord
Macaluso v. Mondadori Publ'g Co., 527 F. Supp. 1017, 1019 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
159. Barrett v. Rosenthal, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142, 166 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), rev'd 40 Cal. 4th
33 (2006) (stating that the "Good Samaritan" provision did not eliminate knowledge-based
liability).
160. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) ("[L]awsuits seeking
to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher's traditional editorial functionssuch as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content-are barred."); see also
Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 51-52 (D.D.C. 1998) (discussing how the CDA bars
liability, even against the court's better judgment).
161. Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 52 ("Congress has made a different policy choice by
providing immunity even where the interactive service provider has an active, even aggressive
role in making available content prepared by others.").
162. See id. (noting Congress's policy change in providing immunity).
163. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2000); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1034 (9th Cir.
2003).
164. WSBTV.com, supra note 20; USATODAY.com, supra note 24.
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defamation principles without the benefit of CDA immunity. The question
then, is whether MySpace users who are original publishers, have fulfilled
the standard elements of defamation. As stated in the Background, to
create liability for defamation there must be:
(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another;
(b) an unprivileged publication to a third party;
(c) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the
publisher; and
(d) either actionability of the statement irrespective of special
harm or the existence of special harm caused by the
publication. 165
In the case of the Georgia student whose false MySpace page claimed
to represent teacher Robert Muzillo, the statement that Muzillo had "lost an
eye wrestling with alligators and midgets'' 66 appears, on its face, to be a
false statement of fact. There is no element of opinion in the statement.
Broadcasting this kind of statement on MySpace would qualify as an
unprivileged publication to a third party, because the page would be
viewable by anyone with an Internet connection. Considering that the page
was created as a joke aimed at Muzillo, the student's level of fault would
rise from mere negligence to knowledge. Such a level of fault would create
actionability regardless of whether Muzillo could show special harm.
Therefore, at first glance, it appears that the student would fulfill the
elements of defamation and would therefore face liability.
However, it is possible that the student could escape liability precisely
because the MySpace page was created as a joke. As Doe v. Cahill
indicates, the plaintiff "must prove that a statement is factually based and
thus capable of a defamatory meaning."'' 67 In Cahill,the court held that if a
reasonable reader would not view the posted statements as facts, based on
the context of where and how the statements were made, then the publisher
of those statements would not be liable for defamation. 68 Because the
false MySpace profile was so outrageous,' 69 it is likely that no reasonable
reader would believe that Muzillo lost an eye wrestling alligators and
midgets. Thus, it follows that the student is unlikely to face liability under
the tort of defamation.
Accordingly, it may be difficult for defamation liability to apply to
165. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).

166.
167.
168.
169.

WSBTV.com, supra note 20.
Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 467-68 n.78 (Del. 2005).
Id. at 466-67.
WSBTV.com, supra note 20.
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MySpace at all, and without defamation there is no need for CDA
immunity. Considering that MySpace is primarily a site for socializing and
not the place to go for hard-hitting news or research, 170 many potentially
defamatory statements may escape liability simply because MySpace
viewers will not necessarily take what they read as fact.
Of course, this does not render MySpace users immune from
defamation by default. It is still possible, even in the social context of
MySpace, to purposefully make false statements that others believe to be
fact and to damage a person's reputation with those statements. Take the
hypothetical example of a user who posts a bulletin board message alleging
that someone has cheated on his or her spouse. If this message is sent to
everyone in their friends network and they take the message seriously, then
the statement could be construed as fact and as harmful to reputation. The
primary lesson to be gleaned from Cahill is that the context of a medium
like MySpace, where there are over a hundred million users who can both
post and read statements,' 7 ' is different from other media like newspapers,
where statements are published by professionals with a responsibility and
expectation for truthfulness.' 72
IV.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

There are some interesting problems that arise when applying the
CDA "Good Samaritan" provision in a context as localized as a MySpace
user's page. Ironically, the outcomes in these types of cases are
counterintuitive in terms of when liability will or will not apply. The
reasons for these outcomes seem simple enough: Congress enacted the
"Good Samaritan" provision ten years ago. Technology has since evolved
and changed, and along with it, so have the roles and functions that
individual users play when communicating online. In cases where
publishers intuitively deserve liability, courts have found ways to bypass
immunity while staying within the framework of the CDA, but this has
often created awkward or inconsistent lines of reasoning. The most helpful
solution would be for Congress to examine these problems and revisit
§ 230 from a fresh perspective, taking new forms of online communication
such as MySpace into consideration.
According to current case law, MySpace users will be subject to
standard defamation law for statements or content they create on their
personal pages, but not necessarily for defamatory materials reposted on
170. MySpace.com, supra note 2.
171. Murdoch, supra note 4.
172. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 466-67 (Del. 2005).
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their pages or posted in their "Comments" section by other users. The
casual social atmosphere of MySpace may make it more difficult for
conduct to be taken seriously enough to rise to the level of tortious
defamation under the standard common law elements. On the other hand,
the same casual atmosphere may lead users to believe that they can say
anything they want without facing legal consequences. Despite the
informal context of MySpace, any communication that meets the elements
of defamation potentially faces legal liability. Given that there are over one
hundred million users, 173 even a few cases could represent a significant
problem looming over the legal landscape.
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